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THE "IMMINENT THREAT" REQUIREMENT FOR THE USE OF
PREEMPTIVE MILITARY FORCE: IS IT TIME FOR A NON-TEMPORAL
STANDARD?
Mark L. Rockefeller*
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack
before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves scholars and
international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the
existence of an imminent threat - most often a visible mobilization of armies,
navies, and air forces preparing to attack'
Under customary international law, a state may use preemptive military force
only if faced with an imminent threat.2 The concept of imminence is traditionally
understood in a temporal sense-that is, imminent is nearly synonymous with
immediate. Thus, a preemptive strike may generally only take place immediately
prior to the attack it is intended to thwart. Put another way, the nearness of the
impending attack determines the appropriateness of a preemptive strike.
We now live in an age of terrorism and "uniquely destructive weaponry,"
3
such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).4  The capabilities of the Al-
Qaeda5 network and the willingness of terrorist organizations to cause calamitous
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1. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, at 15 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (emphasis added).
2. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, The Sixteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International
Law, 176 MIL. L. REV. 364, 378 (2003).
3. Louis R. Beres, The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can it Include
Assassination?, 31 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 157, 165 (2002).
4. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is the general term given for a class of weapons to
include: nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiation weapons.
5. Al-Qaeda, "the base" in Arabic, was founded by Osama bin Laden in 1989, eventually
merging with Egypt's Jihad, the organization behind the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat in 1981. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the deaths of U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1993, the
World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,
the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City and
Washington, D.C. See generally PETER L. BERGEN, JR., HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD
OF OSAMA BIN LADEN (2002).
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harm are as clear as the images seared into the minds of television viewers around
the globe on September 11, 2001.
The issue therefore arises: Do modem technologies make waiting for a visible
"mobilization of armies" unrealistic? Do terrorist tactics necessitate a broader
interpretation of imminence by the international community? Could a non-
temporal standard adequately assure the necessity of the use of preemptive force
and that other, non-forceful options have been exhausted?
This article explores whether the traditional temporal interpretation of
imminence should be changed. The article argues for an improved standard-one
that retains the requirement for necessity, while eliminating the outmoded
requirement for immediacy. It argues that modem weaponry and terrorist tactics
countermand the current time-based standard. Part I gives background
information, a history of the current understanding of imminence in international
law, the evolution in weaponry, and an overview of current state behavior relative
to the existing standard. Part II analyzes why a temporal interpretation of
imminence may be outdated, reviews current scholarship in the field, and notes
other areas of law in which the concept of imminence is understood non-
temporally. Part III suggests an alternative approach, describes the components of
such an approach, and discusses its relative strengths and weaknesses. Finally,
Part IV summarizes and gives recommendations for the implementation of this
new standard.
1. BACKGROUND
While Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of U.N. Charter broadly prohibit the use of
unilateral military force, Article 51 provides an exception for instances of self-
defense.6  Considered an "inherent right"7 for states, self-defense is the only
justifiable rationale for the use of armed force without U.N. Security Council
approval.8 Self-defense is an established doctrine. However, the legality of the
use of force in self-defense to thwart an attack before the attacker fires the first
shot (i.e. preemptive military force) is hotly debated. Scholars disagree on whether
preemptive force is permissible at all under a strict interpretation of Article 51 and
struggle to reconcile prohibitions on the use of force with actual state practice.
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 ("All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered."); U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."); U.N. CHARTER art. 51
("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security."), available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
7. Michael J. Glennon, Preemptive Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, THE
WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 2002, at 3.
8. Id.
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Customary international law requires that force, when used, "comply with
three basic criteria-necessity, proportionality, and imminency." 9 In this paper, I
will not discuss proportionality. I shall assume that a state adheres to this doctrine
in any use of force it applies-be it preemptive or otherwise. Similarly, necessity
will only be discussed within the broader concept of imminence. This article
focuses, rather, on the legality of a specifically preemptive action, the concept of
imminence, and its inadequacy to meet contemporary threats.
To conceptualize this issue, it is useful to think of a timeline, with the
occurrence of the armed attack at the center and lines extending into the past and
the future. Given this framework, the current standard of imminence requires that
an anticipatory attack be close to the center of the timeline; that is, near to the time
at which the actual armed attack would occur absent intervention.' 0 Please keep
this conceptualization in mind as we explore the history of the current standard.
A. History, Evolution and Ambiguity of the Imminent Threat Requirement
The classic definition of imminence governing the use of preemptive force is
found in the famous Caroline incident. On December 29, 1837, approximately
eighty British soldiers crossed the U.S. border into New York from Canada and
seized a small steamer known as the Caroline. " Canada was a British colony, and
British forces believed that rebels attempting to overthrow the Crown were using
the vessel to support raids into Canada. Acting in "self-defense," the British
crossed into U.S. territory, stormed the ship, set it on fire, and sent it over Niagara
Falls. 12 Protesting the incident, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster argued that
in order to legitimately claim self-defense, the British must have had "necessity of
self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
of deliberation."'13  To those who believe preemptive self-defense is legally
justifiable, this classic temporal definition still applies today.'4
It is important to note, however, that the legality of preemptive force as a
legal concept is not codified in the U.N. Charter, even though the principle has
been recognized by international legal bodies as customary international law. For
example, the Caroline standard was relied on by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, by the International Court of Justice in its Nicaragua
decision, and by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the
Use of Nuclear Weapons.' 5 Thus, there exists general agreement that preemptive
military force is acceptable under customary international law if the threat is
imminent.'
6
9. Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 513,
529 (2003).
10. Sean D. Magenis, Natural Law as the Customary International Law of Self-Defense, 20 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 413, 420 (2002).
11. See Schmitt, supra note 9, at 529.
12. Id. at 529.
13. Id. at 530.
14. See Magenis, supra note 10, at 420.
15. See Schmitt, supra note 9, at 530.
16. In class comment from Professor Ved P. Nanda, class discussion, International Law,
2004
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But this classic standard has not remained static. For example, during the
Cold War, a polarized world and the threat of nuclear holocaust led to the
suggestion that the traditional concept of immediacy adjust to a more liberal
understanding of imminence-one that aligned with mid-twentieth century state
practice.17 In the opinion of some, it was President John F. Kennedy and the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 that manifested a shift in the U.S. policy of
preemption.' 8 The Kennedy Administration's use of a "quarantine" against Cuba
was technically a blockade-arguably, a preemptive act of aggression.19 Yet, in
hindsight, the blockade was generally viewed positively by the international
community as a "cautious, limited, and carefully calibrated" response.2 ° Thus, as
early as the 1960s, an evolution in the Caroline standard was evident.
The ambiguity of the imminent standard, as reflected in the inconsistent
international reactions to acts of preemption, supports a call for further evolution.
For example, in 1967, Israel, surrounded by opposition forces, initiated a
preemptive first-strike against Egypt.21 The United Nations did not condemn
Israel's preemptive action (it only asked Israel to return the conquered territories),
because Israel's use of force was deemed to be sufficiently necessary-that is, the
Egyptian threat was considered to be imminent.22 Yet in 1981, Israel performed
preemptive air strikes once again, this time against an Iraqi nuclear plant.23 Here,
Israel's claims of "self-defense" fell on deaf ears. The U.N. Security Council
unanimously condemned the attack, because it doubted the imminence of the threat
posed by the incomplete reactor.24 Israel's 1981 attack was viewed as being
without legal basis, and the distinction between the 1967 and 1981 attacks was
ostensibly reasonable. In contrast, however, consider Operation Desert Fox, a
1998 four-day British and American bombing campaign against chemical and
biological weapons facilities in Iraq.25 The potential use of, or target for, Iraq's
weapons was unknown. Only speculation linked the threat to British or American
interests-a chemical or biological attack was not imminent, in the traditional
sense. Yet, Operation Desert Fox was not condemned by the U.N. Security
Council; tacit approval was given for the preemptive use of force in order to
counter a threat which was not yet demonstrated to be imminent.26  Thus,
conflicting international reactions to state practice, in seemingly analogous
University of Denver College of Law (Jan. 2004).
17. See Magenis, supra note 10, at 423.
18. See Schmitt, supra note 9, at 545.
19. THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE (2002), excerpted in BARRY E. CARTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 985 (2003).
20. Id.
21. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal on a New Executive Order on Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 751, 776 (2003).
22. Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a
Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 191 (1984); see also Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva
Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 81 (2002).
23. See Schmitt, supra note 9, at 546
24. Id.
25. See Magenis, supra note 10, at 428.
26. Id. at 429-30.
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situations, represent ambiguity in the traditional standard used to determine what
constitutes an imminent threat.
B. Evolution in Weaponry
On a parallel timeline, the weapons of war have evolved. In modem warfare,
a single attack can be instantaneous and devastating. As U.N. Secretary General
Kofi Annan stated regarding September 1 th, 2001, "it is hard to imagine how the
tragedy could have been worse. Yet, the truth is that a single attack involving a
nuclear or biological weapon could have killed millions. 27  It has become
increasingly clear that terrorists, fueled by the desire for mass casualties and
increased media attention, are more and more willing to use devastating
technologies.
28
Proliferation of nuclear materials adds to this concern. The post-Cold War
disintegration of the Soviet Union, with the accompanying economic and political
tribulations, created a market for WMDs and associated materials.29 This era
similarly gave rise to an increase in rogue states and transnational terrorist
groups.30 Indeed, the potential of such groups to acquire WMDs is greater now
than at any other time in history.31 The risk is profound.
Consider the capabilities of modem weapons. For example, beginning in
March of 1988, the Iraqi military, using a combination of artillery and air forces,
dumped chemical agents on Kurdish cities in northern Iraq.32 Experts estimate that
a combination of mustard gas, sarin, and VX nerve agents were used.33 Tens of
thousands of Kurds were "permanently blinded, sterilized, disfigured and
unnaturally prone to develop cancer., 34  Human Rights Watch estimates than
between 50,000 and 100,000 were killed.35 The long term effects of the attacks
may linger for generations. For example, in the Kurdish city of Halabja, abnormal
births are more common than normal births.36
Alarmingly, detection of such virulent materials is difficult. Many chemical
and biological weapons components are "dual use"-that is, they have legitimate
commercial applications in addition to use in weaponry.3 7  In effect, this fact
decreases the ease of detection while simultaneously increasing the ease of
27. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General, Addressing the Assembly on Terrorism
(Oct. 1, 2001), U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7977, available at
http://www.un.orgfNews/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7977.doc.htm.
28. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 377.
29. Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing
the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
483, 491-92 (1999).
30. See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at. 13.
31. BARRY E. CARTERET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1125 (2003).
32. Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of Anticipatory
Counter- Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 151, 158 (2002).
33. Id. at 158-59.
34. Id. at 158.
35. Id. at 158.
36. Id.
37. See Carter, supra note 31, at 1126.
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acquisition. For example, in 1995 a religious sect released a chemical agent in a
Tokyo subway in an attack that killed twelve people and injured thousands.38
More disturbing, the agent (sarin gas) used in the attack was manufactured by the
sect itself.
39
Chemical agents are not the only threat. Scholars have written volumes on
the problem of nuclear weapon proliferation and the increasing opportunity for
terrorists groups to obtain such a uniquely destructive capability. Currently, at
least nine states are known, or thought, to possess nuclear weapons, and more may
obtain the capability in the future.40 The destruction from even a small nuclear
device is nothing short of catastrophic. The Director of Harvard's Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs paints the picture of what might have
happened on September 1 1th:
Had al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center ... with a vehicle containing a
nuclear device ... [it] could create an explosive force of 10,000 to 20,000 tons
of TNT, demolishing an area of about three square miles. Not only the World
Trade Center, but all of Wall Street and the financial district, and the lower tip of
Manhattan up to Gramercy Park would have disappeared. Hundreds of
thousands of people would have died suddenly.
4 1
While an actual nuclear weapon is difficult to obtain, access to basic
radioactive materials could permit terrorist groups to create a "dirty bomb," in
which radioactive "dust" is dispersed through a traditional explosive device.42
Small and easy to conceal, a dirty bomb causes latent defects and cancers in
exposed victims, even those safely out of the reach of the initial explosion. As a
result, the attractiveness of a dirty bomb to terrorists is rooted in the bomb's ability
to create a massive economic impact on the area surrounding the site of the
explosion.43 As of January 2004, experts unequivocally stated that terrorist groups
possess the will to use such a weapon and that they are "doing everything they
can" to acquire the materials. 44
WMDs are not useful without the means to deliver them. However, terrorist
organizations now possess delivery technologies previously available only to
states. "Sensors, information processing, and precision guidance technologies" in
"off-the-shelf' forms may be obtained by terrorists and those sympathetic to them
for integration into their weapons systems.45  Consider the U.S. Defense
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id at 961.
41. Graham Allison, Could Worse Be Yet to Come?, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 2001, available at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm?StoryjD=842483.
42. Associated Press, U.S. Terror Expert Warns of Dirty Bomb, February 8, 2004, available at
http://www.macon.com!mld/macon/7907695.htm.
43. David Rose, Iraq's Arsenal of Terror, VANITY FAIR, May 2002, at 124.
44. See Associated Press, supra note 42.
45. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 2001, at 6,
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr200 I.pdf.
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Department's guiding document, Joint Vision (JV) 2020,46 which cautions against
the side-effects of globalization, warning that militarily useful technologies "such
as commercial satellites, digital communications [equipment], and the public
Internet" are now in the hands of those who previously could not afford them.47
Moreover, from a defensive perspective, the information revolution and the
availability of computers and related equipment make detection of illicit materials
(those used to construct such weapons) more difficult.48 This fact increases the
potential for miscalculation on the part of the victim state and makes more likely a
surprise attack on the part of terrorist groups.49 As the National Security Strategy
of the United States released in 2002 evinces, "America is menaced less by
conquering states than we are by failing ones.., less by fleets and armies than by
catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.
50
C. State Practice and the Current Standard of Imminence
The nexus of terrorism and WMDs thus creates a significant threat to the very
global security the U.N. Charter intended to preserve. To meet this threat, the
international community has, at times, responded preemptively.
For example, consider the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan. Little, if any,
international opposition to this campaign existed.5' Indeed, most nations believed
inherently that the United States had a right to act, and many nations
communicated this belief by supporting the effort through the provision of military
aid. When Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan on October 7,
2001, NATO and U.N. allies from around the globe contributed.5 2 French, British,
Australian, Canadian, and indigenous Afghan forces fought alongside American
troops, while other nations, such as Russia and China, supplied logistical or public
support.53 Several nations opened airspace, Qatar and Kuwait allowed the use of
airbases to American aircraft, and NATO aircraft patrolled the skies over the
United States in order to alleviate the burden on American aircraft performing
domestic defense and free them for operations in Afghanistan. 54 For the first time
in history, NATO invoked Article 5 of its treaty, which considers an attack against
any NATO nation an attack against them all.5 5 The U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 1368 strongly condemning the terrorist attack, expressing its readiness
to take "all necessary steps ... to combat all forms of terrorism" in response, and
affirming the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" pursuant to
Article 51.56 A collective war against the Taliban and AI-Qaeda had begun; and, in
46. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2020 (2000), at 5, available at
http:www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm.
47. Id.
48. See Carter, supra note 3 1, at 1126.
49. Id.
50. See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 1.
51. See Carter, supra note 31 at 80.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 73.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 73.
56. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368, available at
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the name of self-defense, the international community was supportive.
But was Operation Enduring Freedom really about self-defense? Invading
Afghanistan was not going to have any ameliorative or preclusive effects on the
destruction caused on September 11, 2001. The damage in New York,
Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania was already done. No amount of success by
the international community in Afghanistan would lessen or assuage the harm.
Perhaps the invasion of Afghanistan was actually two-pronged: it was both an
act of reprisal and an act of preemption-reprisal for acts which had already
occurred, and preemption for acts to come.58 Reprisal and preemption go hand in
hand-indeed, they are flip sides of the same coin. Consider the permissibility of
reprisals under customary international law according to the Nauliaa case decided
by the special arbitration Tribunal established under the Treaty of Versailles.5 9
The Tribunal stated, "[reprisals] seek to impose on the offending State reparations
for the offense, the return to legality and the avoidance of new offenses."
60
Moreover, in the famous Nicaragua case in 1986, the International Court of Justice
"refrained from ruling that all armed reprisals are unlawful," thereby implicitly
approving of reprisals in certain instances.61
Thus, the world's action in Afghanistan was, in part, preemptive. In addition
to punishing the Taliban regime for its support of terrorism, the invasion was
intended to prevent the regime and A1-Qaeda from endangering the citizens of the
world in the future. Consider the impact of Operation Enduring Freedom. Far
from the typical retaliatory "tit for tat" military strike, Operation Enduring
Freedom was expansive-international forces invaded a foreign nation, removed
its government, replaced it with one more friendly, and did this all with the
approval of the "international community" and the United Nations. The world
acted in retaliation for what had already been done and to preempt future acts of
terrorism.
But why do some members of the international community condone one act
of preemption (invasion of Afghanistan) and condemn others (the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, arguably)? Political motivations aside, states condone preemption when the
necessity of the action has been demonstrated to their satisfaction. In Afghanistan,
the imminency of the threat posed by the Taliban and AI-Qaeda was
incontrovertible (if not irrelevant), because the attacks of September 1 1th had
already occurred. A similar campaign on September 10'h, 2001 would likely not
have received the same support. Thus, the real issue is not traditional (temporal)
imminence at all, but rather necessity; imminence being merely a measure of
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001 .htm.
57. See Posteraro, supra note 32, at 202.
58. See generally id.
59. Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 Recueil des Cours 455, 458-460 (1952, vol. 11), excerpted in 12 Whiteman,
Digest of International Law 148-49 (1963).
60. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
61. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE ( 3 rd ed. 2001), excerpted in BARRY
E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 997 (2003).
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necessity. If this is true, if necessity can be demonstrated before the attack, then a
nation should not be required to wait to be attacked before it can defend itself,
especially if the first blow is potentially devastating.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Sailors' Dilemma
Professor Paul H. Robinson aptly illustrates the broad problems inherent in a
temporal interpretation of imminence in his Sailor's Dilemma. Speaking primarily
of the criminal context, he presents an illustrative conceptual hypothetical:
A slow leak is found by a crew of a seagoing vessel shortly after the ship
leaves port for a long journey to a remote part of the ocean. The ship's Captain
refuses to heed to the crew's pleadings to cancel the journey. The slow leak will
take two days to sink the ship; thus, it poses no immediate risk. However, absent
intervention, the leak poses a definite and certain future risk of sinking the ship.
The dilemma: may the sailors mutiny to gain control of the ship now, while they
are still close to shore and the chances of survival are high, or must the crew wait
until the sinking is temporally imminent (immediate), even if waiting means they
will be farther away from the shore and will have a decreased chance of survival?
62
I contend that most rational persons would agree that, absent any special duty
to obey the captain or go down with the ship, the crew should mutiny. After all,
the Captain's actions are suicidal, both for himself and those under his command.
This seems reasonable, since the sailors' right to self-preservation should outweigh
the lack of immediacy. We must weigh the right to self-preservation against any
margin of error in the certainty of the ship sinking. Therefore, if the future harm
can be known with reasonable certainty, and waiting until that harm is immediate
would increase the harm itself, one should be justified in acting early to prevent
such harm. Building on Professor Robinson's model, I contend that terrorist
tactics and technological advancements make a temporal standard particularly
problematic in our age.
B. The "Time Gap " Problem
Why are we so concerned with the temporal element of imminence? Because,
we want states to exhaust all viable non-forceful measures before resorting to the
use of force. Theoretically speaking, the current standard legitimizes the use of
preemptive military force only when the state being attacked has no time for
anything other than the use of force.
Such a definition, however, assumes a "time gap." That is, the difference in
time between the point at which a state becomes aware of a forthcoming attack and
the point at which the impact of that attack is felt. Under the current standard, a
state may use preemptive force only when this "time gap" is sufficiently small.
Sufficiently small traditionally meaning the "visible mobilization of armies"
63
referred to in the introduction.
62. 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §124(f)(1) (1984).
63. See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 15.
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But the traditional standard of imminence assumes that this "time gap" is
knowable. What if in the age of terrorism, the "time gap" is not adequately
knowable? We know that terrorists rely on surprise and deception; the attacks of
September 1 1th demonstrated this reality.64  Terrorist thrive on asymmetric
warfare;65 that is, striking the enemy using weapons, and in a manner, they least
expect. Thus, one reason for the inadequacy of the current temporal interpretation
of imminence is that it assumes the victim-state can discern the precise point in
time at which waiting to act becomes waiting too long. Additionally, the
proliferation of WMDs, and the willingness of terrorists to use them, may increase
the cost of waiting to an unacceptable level. In weighing the right to self-
preservation against the margin of error in the certainty of the attack, the extent of
the damage, if an attack occurs, must also be considered.
The temporal standard of imminence is rooted in the year 1837, in an age of
muskets and colonial militias. The "time gap" is less knowable now, or at least
exponentially smaller, than it was in 1837. Further, the consequences of an attack
are exponentially greater. Thus, a new standard is needed-a new standard that
accounts for the diminished "time gap" resulting from terrorism and modem
weaponry, but does not sacrifice the principle of necessity.
C. Current Scholarship
The inadequacy of the current standard of imminence is acknowledged by
scholars. For example, New York University's Thomas M. Franck asserts that
technological transformation of weapons and delivery systems (specifically
rocketry), "make obsolete" parts of the U.N. Charter's Article 51 provision. He
argues that new technology has blurred the line between what is and what is not an
appropriate point at which to act preemptively. Consequently, requiring a state to
await the initial attack before instituting countermeasures creates a reductio ad
absurdum. 67 Inevitably, according to Franck, rational states respond by claiming a
right to "anticipatory self-defense," a right, he contends, which is outside the literal
interpretation of the Charter.6 8 Moreover, the Charter envisioned a Security
Council with a strong military police force capable of quelling disputes at its
disposal; yet this never materialized. 69 Thus, in the absence of a powerful Security
Council enforcer, 70 states behave rationally, in the interest of self- preservation,
and exceed the delineations of the Charter. As Franck concludes, "common sense
is often the best guide to international legal norms.7
64. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 383.
65. Asymmetric warfare is a military term referring to the leveraging of inferior tactical or
operational ability against a stronger opponent's vulnerabilities with the aim of achieving a
disproportionate effect.
66. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE To FORCE (2002), excerpted in BARRY E. CARTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 980 (2003).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 979.
70. Id. at 980.
71. THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE To FORCE 98 (Cambridge University Press) (2002).
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Professor Michael N. Schmitt also agrees that the current standard is
outmoded in a world of WMDs, terrorists, and rogue States.72 He does not blame
the Charter's framers, however, adding that they could not have foreseen the
capabilities of WMDs and the willingness of terrorists to use exceptionally violent
means to influence governments.73 Schmitt does proffer a potential solution. He
recommends that states be allowed to take (preemptive) defensive actions only
"during the last viable window of opportunity;" that is, the point, after which a
"viable defense [would be] ineffectual. 74  Of course, the tricky part is the
measurement of such a point. This is addressed in the proposed definition of
imminence in Part III.
The inadequacies of the current standard, and resulting state recalcitrance,
were seen before the events of September 1 th. Stanford University's Abraham
Sofaer wrote in 1989 of his concern that "respect for traditional doctrine is
undermined when States are expected to accept too high a degree of risk of
substantial injury before defending themselves. 75 On the other hand, Professor
Mary Ellen O'Connell argues that so long as violation of international law is
"treated as a violation, and not a movement toward a new customary rule, then the
old law remains viable., 76 How can we reconcile these views?
If a new and different "twenty-first century threat environment ' '77 truly exists,
then legal changes may be necessary. If so, other fields of law, facing similar
pressures to evolve, might provide useful insight.
D. Imminence in Other Contexts
In cases of battered women who kill in self-defense, criminal defense
attorneys are currently battling for a practical definition of imminence.78 Several
cases exist in which battered women have killed their abusers at a non-
confrontational moment; 79 that is, at a moment in which the threat was not
temporally imminent. Here, as in the national defense context, the requirement for
imminence has proven problematic for claims of self-defense. 0
The two concepts of self-defense (self-defense claimed by battered women
and self-defense claimed by states) are undoubtedly highly distinguishable. Yet,
they are similar insofar as both fields wrestle with the apparent inadequacy of a
traditional legal theory that fails to provide justification for an act of self-defense
that seems intuitively and morally acceptable. 1
72. See generally Schmitt, supra note 2.
73. See Posteraro, supra note 32, at 185.
74. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 394.
75. Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and National Defense 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 97-98
(1989). Nothing is highlighted
76. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 15 (2002).
77. See Schmitt, supra note 9, at 513.
78. Jeffrey B. Murdoch, Is Imminence Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-Defense
Doctrine with the Battered Woman Syndrome 20 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 191 (2000).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 193.
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In the case of a battered woman, we are uncomfortable with the law's
inability to handle situations where a victim kills her batterer, seemingly
justifiably, but at a non-confrontational time and place.82 In the United States, a
battered woman's self-defense claim will generally fail if the woman kills during a
lull in the violence, such as while the aggressor's back is turned or when the
woman has the opportunity to escape.83 German civil law however applies a more
progressive standard of imminence.84 For example, in 1979, the German High
Court (Bundersgerichtshof) held that an imminent danger can endure prolonged
periods of time.85 Similarly, in another case involving a false imprisonment claim,
the German High Court vacated a lower court's judgment against the defendants
by finding that "the perceived danger need not be immediate ... it merely needs to
be ongoing, intermittent, or cyclical in nature."
86
The German standard should not be shocking; for if imminence can endure
long periods of time, and if imminence can be found in the ongoing, intermittent or
cyclical nature of the threat, then one can determine with adequate certainty that
the threat still exists. Thus, the threat may still be imminent, even in the absence
of an immediate attack. Could a potential model for the use of force in
international disputes lie in the efforts to liberalize the "imminence" requirement
for battered women acting in self-defense? 87 I believe it could-if the international
community concludes, as the Germans did in the above cases, that the true
importance of imminence is as a yardstick for necessity, not a stopwatch.
E. What We Really Seek to Measure: Necessity
In the national defense context, an analogous situation to the battered woman
killing during a lull in the violence occurs when a state acts preemptively to
neutralize a threat, but does so weeks (or even months) before the aggressor's
attack would have taken place. This analogy only fits if the threat is on-going,
intermittent, and cyclical. Yet, as I will demonstrate, such is the case with
terrorism. Striking during a lull in the violence seems intuitively justifiable in both
contexts; but they are, at once, illegal under the current interpretation of
imminence. I believe this paradox is rooted in confusion over the relationship
between "imminence" and "necessity."
The requirement for imminence is meant to assure the necessity of an act.
That is, we want nations (and battered women) to exhaust other possibilities before
82. Id.
83. See generally Danielle R. Dubin, A Woman's Cry for Help: Why the United States Should
Apply Germany's Modelfo Self-Defense for the Battered Woman 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 235, 240
(1995).
84. Id at 257.
85. Id at 261. See also Karl Lackner, STRAFGESETZBUCH MIT ERLAUTERUNGEN §34, at 214
(Beck 18th ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
86. See Dubin, supra note 83, at 263 (emphasis added).
87. See generally George P. Fletcher, How Would the Bush Administration's Claims of Self-
Defense, Used as Justifications for War with Iraq, Fare Under Domestic Rules of Self-Defense? (Sept.
10, 2002), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020910_fletcher.html.
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resorting to "self-help." 88  For example, in the context of battered women,
Professor Richard Rosen argues that imminence "has no significance independent
of the notion of necessity." Rather, he views imminence as a "translator" for
necessity. 89 He contends that imminence is but one component of necessity, and,
when the two conflict, imminence should yield to necessity, since the "purpose of
making an inquiry regarding imminence is to determine if an action was
necessary." 90
It makes sense to allow separation of the two concepts when required. One
can think of cases when "self-help" is necessary, but the threat is not temporally
imminent (e.g., the Sailors' Dilemma). Similarly, situations exist where the threat
may be imminent (i.e., near in time), but reasonable alternative courses of action
still exist that would make the use of "self-help" inappropriate, despite the
nearness of the threat.
In the battered women context, the violence usually occurs in a cycle: a
heating-up period, an act of violence, followed by a respite, then a repetition.91 In
other words a temporary cessation in the violence does not mean the violence is
over, only that a lull or break is taking place. Thus, if the temporal element is
removed, what was once viewed as a cessation of violence from a temporal
perspective can now be viewed as a stage in an on-going cycle of violence.
Further, the respite would have no effect on the likelihood of a future attack, only
on the timing of such an attack.
Similarly, in the national defense context, terrorists groups attack using
intermittent, cyclical force. Consider Al-Qaeda. In addition to the more recent
September 11' h, Baja and Madrid attacks, the group was involved in the 1993
World Trade Center bombing, attacks on U.S. soldiers in Somalia and Yemen in
1993, the 1998 bombings of two U.S. Embassies, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, a
failed millennium celebration attack in Jordan, and failed assassination attempts of
President Clinton and the Pope. 92 Such a pattern appears to be a one single
campaign of intermittent violence. Like wife batterers, terrorists harm in a cyclical
fashion, with "lulls" occurring between attacks. The time and place of the next
attack is unknown, however the certainty of the attack, if left unchecked, may be
reasonably knowable.
Moreover, the terrorists' intentions are often expressly communicated.
Consider AI-Qaeda's public communications. In 1998, Osama bin Laden
announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and
the Crusaders.93  The ihaugural announcement declared "to kill and fight
Americans and their allies, whether civilian or military, is an obligation for every
88. See Schmitt, supra 9, at 530.
89. Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, And Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71
N.C. L. REv. 371, 380 (1993).
90. See Murdoch, supra note 78, at 193.
91. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
92. See Schmitt, supra 9, at 535-36.
93. PETER L. BERGEN, JR., HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OSAMA BIN LADEN
98 (2002).
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Muslim who is able to do so in every country... abide by Allah's order by killing
Americans and stealing their money anywhere, anytime, and whenever possible."
94
Taking the organization at its word, Al-Qaeda's intentions for an on-going terror
campaign could hardly be clearer.
Thus, the problem faced by states who know they are on a terrorist's target
list is the same problem faced by battered women who know their abuser will
strike again. Should women or nations (or the ship's crew) be permitted under law
to behave rationally and save themselves while they have the opportunity? Or,
should they, as the current law would require, wait until the danger is near in time,
but the chance of survival is substantially decreased? The traditional
understanding of imminence creates this dilemma. In the national security context,
the mire thickens with the possibility of terrorists using WMDs, since the
terrorist's first strike could be debilitating. This is much like a battered woman,
long abused by the fist or rod, who knows her aggressor has just acquired a gun,
and possesses the will and knowledge to use it. A change in tactics and technology
by the aggressor necessitates a change in how imminence should be viewed. As
one writer put it, "when a theory yields results that seem counter-intuitive, then the
theory itself must be examined to determine if it is the theory or our intuition that
is flawed." 95 Following the German standard for cyclical violence, perhaps a
liberalization of the imminent threat requirement for use of force is appropriate.
But, what might such a non-temporal standard look like? And, could it be applied
to aggressor states, as well as transnational terrorist organizations?
III. AN ALTERNATIVE: A NON-TEMPORAL STANDARD OF IMMINENCE
Having established that imminence is merely a component of necessity, and
proof of necessity is the true aim of the self-defense doctrine, an alternative non-
temporal standard must effectively account for the primary components of
necessity: certainty, severity, and the unavailability of other viable options.
As such, perhaps a new definition of "imminent danger" would be more
appropriate: Imminent danger is that which will occur with certainty, as
determined by the on-going, intermittent, or cyclical nature of the danger and
manifested through previous acts or statements of intent. Force may be used when
the value of the damage likely to be prevented is greater than the value of the
damage likely to be caused, and viable non-forceful options have been exhausted,
to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
This example is merely a starting point for a non-temporal standard. While it
is certainly imperfect, it represents the main components that should be included in
such a standard, namely: a high degree of certainty, the weighing of the impact of
the preemptive strike on the recipient state against the impact of the strike it is
intended to preclude, the exhaustion of non-forceful alternatives, and a standard to
be applied.
94. Id.
95. See Murdoch, supra note 78, at 191.
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Since it may be easier to establish the cyclical, on-going nature of attacks
from terrorist organizations than those of states, such a standard may only be
applicable to terrorist entities. If, however, state belligerence creates a similar
identifiable pattern, which satisfies the certainty requirement, it could, potentially,
be applicable to states as well. In both cases, the burden of proof would be on the
nation using preemptive military force. Moreover, the requirement for weighing
the damage caused by a preemptive attack against that which would occur absent
preemptive action is especially appropriate for terrorists who are planning the use
of WMDs. In the case of a WMD attack, the damage on the victim state would be
substantial. Therefore, if the potential victim-state uses force preemptively, even
firm military force will be more than outweighed by the damage avoided. As a
result, the new standard of imminence would permit greater latitude on the part of
the state acting preemptively. However, it does so only in one element of the new
standard; namely, the balancing of costs element. Thus, the possession of WMDs
by one's opposition does not necessarily legitimize preemptive force; it merely tips
the scales of one of the elements used to determine necessity. In so doing, the
standard correctly weights the existence of WMDs by one party, without giving the
other party a blank check to use force. The new standard, therefore, brings an
attribute of flexibility which is absent from the traditional temporal standard of
imminence.
A. Potential Problems with a Non-Temporal Standard
The first potential problem with a non-temporal standard is abuse. States may
use this standard as a pretext for aggression, or gradually encroach beyond the
standard's intended limits. This is particularly true with regard to the several "hot
spots" around the world: China and Taiwan, N. Korea, India and Pakistan, Israel
and Palestine, etc.
The risk of abuse, however, should not be cause to resist change. After all,
the risk of abuse is present with any standard. For example, Nazi defendants at
Nuremberg alleged they were acting in "self-defense;" they claimed that Germany
attacked the Soviet Union, Norway, and Denmark for defensive reasons.96 This
claim was obviously unsuccessful, demonstrating the importance of effective
checks and balances to preclude specious justifications. However, because it is
less ambiguous, the components of a new, non-temporal standard of imminence
actually make it less susceptible to abuse than the traditional temporal standard.
Clarity, regardless of whether that clarity raises or lowers the bar for the use of
force, is better than ambiguity for purposes of enforcement. The more nebulous a
standard, the more potential for abuse-and the traditional standard is exceedingly
nebulous. A new, non-temporal standard, consisting of the components mentioned
above would be more precise than the existing standard, thus less subject to
exploitation.
The second potential risk is that terrorist groups may attempt to preclude the
forthcoming preemption; they may believe that they must use their WMDs or lose
96. Michael J. Glennon, Preemptive Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, THE
WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 2002, at 2.
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them. This argument rests on the assumption that a more definite standard for
preemptive military force would actually give the terrorist notice as to when states
may preemptively attack, thereby encouraging the terrorists to use weapons they
might not have used otherwise.97 However, one may assume that most terrorist
groups do not yet have WMDs and/or delivery methods in sufficient configurations
to use them (after all, they have demonstrated the will to cause catastrophic loss of
life, but we have not yet seen substantial usage of WMDs). If this is the case, then
providing a clear legal framework to govern the use of preemptive military force,
and doing so urgently, is even more important. A non-temporal framework would
provide a legal standard by which states could preemptively strike such terrorist
groups now, before the most dangerous weapons become operable.
As Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger cautioned, the use of preemptive
force in an unstable world is highly complicated. 98  Thus, other, reasonable
objections not mentioned here certainly merit consideration. Issues such as: Who
determines the likelihood of a future terrorist attack, even one based on the cyclical
or intermittent nature of past behavior? If the behavior is cyclical, how many
cycles must occur before a cyclical "pattern" is established? Upon whose
intelligence will such decisions be made, and how accurate will they be? Although
more study is certainly needed, many of these are technical issues, pertinent only
after the implementation of the new standard. After all, if one is in desperate need
of lifesaving surgery, it would be foolish to die on the operating table because one
questioned the physician's choice of a particular scalpel. From a legal standpoint,
a non-temporal standard, which is discernable, measurable, and, most importantly,
adhered to, is better than the traditional temporal standard of imminence.
B. Potential Benefits of a Non-Temporal Standard
A primary benefit to this new interpretation is that the information required to
satisfy the elements of this standard would simultaneously also satisfy the
customary international law criteria of necessity and proportionality. For example,
changing the understanding of imminence into one that does not emphasize a
temporal component, but rather requires adequate evidence before striking
preemptively, implicitly satisfies the necessity requirement. Furthermore, the
requirement to weigh the damage done against the damage being prevented, by its
nature, requires consideration of the proportionately criterion.
Second, a non-temporal standard requiring the "weighing of damages"
discussed above would strengthen the legal right of smaller states. If the level of
potential damage is considered in relation to a states ability to withstand that
damage, and smaller states can withstand less damage than can stronger states,
then smaller states are likely to benefit most from a non-temporal standard. An
effects-based standard, rather than a temporal one, gives a smaller state more
latitude to act preemptively to protect itself from an incapacitating blow-a risk
that would be less likely to justify aggression from a stronger state. In this sense, a
non-temporal standard is more equitable. The current standard does not account
97. See Schmitt, supra note 9, at 513.
98. Id. at 514.
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for this distinction.99
Most importantly, an understandable and rational standard will increase state
adherence to the law. International law fails when it seeks to impose rules that are
out-of-sync with the way states actually behave. 00 The laws governing the use of
force are particularly susceptible to abuse. For example, in the years since the
U.N. Charter's formation in 1945, two-thirds of the members of the United
Nations, 126 states, "fought 291 interstate conflicts in which over 22 million
people were killed."'' Moreover, the twentieth century ended with 19 nations
"flagrantly violating" the United Nations' Charter in NATO's Kosovo
campaign. 10 2 With regard to the use of force, the International Community often
imposes obligations reflective of positive law, but "out-of-sync" with normative
behavior. Thus, the problem lies in failing to distinguish between lex lata and lex
ferata; that is, the law as it actually is, and the law as we wish it to be.
A workable standard, one in touch with actual state behavior, would make
control over the use of force more successful in the twenty-first century than it was
in the twentieth. If the international legal community applies a workable standard,
one to which states actually adhere, then state behavior becomes more predictable.
Once behavior is predictable, then the process of gradually shifting the law from
where it currently is to where we would like it to be can be realized. Without
adherence, there is no law; and no reduction of the ugly consequences of war-the
ultimate aim of the United Nations' Charter. International jurists want adherence
to a standard of law. The first step is this direction is to change the current
standard of imminence.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Since September 1 1th, and the resulting "War on Terror," the concept of
imminence has received renewed attention from world leaders, international
lawyers, governments, and scholars.
A change is needed to adjust to the emergence of terrorism. As previously
demonstrated, many scholars recognize that the current standard is flawed. A
temporal standard, rooted in the nineteenth century, is simply not sufficient to
account for the twenty-first century warfare, technologies, and terrorist tactics. A
standard forged when the aggressor held a musket is not applicable when an
aggressor holds a "dirty bomb;" the consequences are far greater.
Historically, major acts of warfare have preceded changes in the international
legal system: World War I ushered in the League of Nations and the Kellogg-
Briand Pact; the United Nations flowed from WWI. 103 The attacks on September
11, 2001 are of sufficient magnitude to precipitate another, albeit more subtle,
change. On September 11 th, terrorists killed nationals of 83 countries, including
99. See id. at 534.
100. See generally id.
101. Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51
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many Muslims and more Americans than on any other day in U.S. history since the
civil war.10 4 The attack evinced a profound change in warfare. A commensurate
change in the legal standard should follow.
This change has already begun. Custom has permitted the use of preemptive
force in spite of a lack of appreciable codification. Opinio juris sive necessitates,
the expectation that a particular form of conduct will be repeated because it
occurred in the past under similar circumstances, forms the foundation for
customary international law.'0 5 The formation of such a custom, even in the case
of non-temporal imminence, was evinced by the broad international support of
(and participation in) Operation Enduring Freedom-a campaign that was, as
demonstrated, preemptive in nature.
States will behave rationally. They will continue to apply preemptive force if
they see it as necessary for their own survival. The United States has made public
its rejection of the outdated temporal standard. President Bush, in his 2002 State
of the Union Address, resolutely stated, "I will not wait on events ... I will not
stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not
permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most
destructive weapons." 10 6 The new policy was repeated unequivocally in the 2004
State of the Union: "America will never seek a permission slip to defend the
security of our country."'
10 7
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi A. Annan, recently appointed a
sixteen-member High-Level Panel of eminent persons with the following charter:
"examin[e] the major threats and challenges the world faces in the broad field of
peace and security, including economic and social issues insofar as they relate to
peace and security, and mak[e] recommendations for the elements of a collective
response."' 0 8 It is my hope that the High-Level Panel will reconsider the existing
legal standard for the use of preemptive military force. International law is
important, and the true strength of the United Nations' Charter lies in the
instrument's "capacity for adaptation through the interpretive practice of its organs
and members."t0 9 Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell asserts that states should argue
for new rules instead of ignoring the existing ones."0 She is certainly correct: the
United States, and all nations threatened by terrorism, should argue for a change in
104. Id. at 63.
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the rules-beginning with the current standard of imminence. A new, non-
temporal standard of imminence would improve the law by allowing states to
protect themselves against terrorist attacks, while also providing the accountability
and transparency desired by the international community.
